

Allowing mobility and preventing migration? The combination of entry and stay in immigration policies

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Online Appendix

Table A1: Data and operationalization

Variable	Operationalization	Data source	Country coverage
Mobility-preference	Relative openness of immigration regulations calculated as internal restrictiveness minus external restrictiveness. External: Aggregated index of entry regulations in terms of their restrictiveness from 0 to 1. Internal: Aggregated index of stay regulations in terms of their restrictiveness from 0 to 1. Additionally, I use the overall policy restrictiveness and the restrictiveness of immigration controls	IMPIC dataset, Helbling et al. 2017 [AvgS_ExtReg_A, AvgS_IntReg_A, AvgS_ExtReg_B, AvgS_IntReg_B, AvgS_ExtReg_C, AvgS_IntReg_C] Additionally: AvgS_ImmPol AvgS_Cont	OECD countries
Left-wing government	Relative power position of social democratic and other left parties in government based on their seat share in parliament, measured in percentage of the total parliamentary seat share of all governing parties. Weighted by the number of days in office in a given year.	CPDS, Armingeon et al. 2018 [gov_left2]	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
Right-wing government	Relative power position of right-wing parties in government based on their seat share in parliament, measured in percentage of the total parliamentary seat share of all governing parties. Weighted by the number of days in office in a given year.	CPDS, Armingeon et al. 2018 [gov_right2]	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

Unemployment	Standardized unemployment rate	International Monetary Fund (IMF)	OECD countries
Radical-right strength	Cumulative vote share of parties belonging to the party family of radical-right populist parties at the last election in percentages.	CPDS, Armingeon et al. 2018 [right1, right2, right3, right4, right5], plus own coding based on Mudde (2004)	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
Union density	The trade union density is defined as the number of net union members (i.e excluding those who are not in the labour force, unemployed and self-employed) as a proportion of the number of employees.	OECD	OECD countries
Strength of judicial review	Index from 1 to 4 taking into account the existence of procedures for judicial review of legislation, the active assertion of this power by courts, and the difficulty to change the constitution. 1 = no judicial review; 2 = weak judicial review; 3 = medium judicial review; 4 = strong judicial review	CPDS, Armingeon et al. 2018 [ljud], based on Lijphart (2012)	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
Share of foreign born	Share of people who have ever migrated from their country of birth to their current country of residence (in per cent of resident population)	OECD (2020), Foreign-born population (indicator). doi: 10.1787/5a368e1b-en (Accessed on 12 April 2020)	OECD countries

Figure A1: Countries' mobility preference by admission channel





Figure A2: Change of mobility preference by admission channel and country



Note: The plot displays how the mobility-preference changed between 1980 and 2010 for each country separated for the three admission channels of asylum, family and labour. The arrows display the size of change and the color the direction of change.

Table A2: Model estimates for cross-country variation in the immigration policy mix

	DV: Mobility-preference		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
New immigration country	0.117*** (0.031)	0.116** (0.032)	0.126* (0.057)
Settler nation	-0.021 (0.040)	-0.023 (0.043)	-0.010 (0.077)
Former colonial power		-0.007 (0.038)	-0.061 (0.059)
Strength of judicial review			-0.025 (0.027)
Constant	-0.024 (0.024)	-0.022 (0.028)	0.079 (0.067)
Observations	33	33	22
Adjusted R ²	0.375	0.354	0.150

Note: Regression model on between-country variation (1980-2010). Guestworker countries as reference category of immigration regimes. Level of statistical significance indicated as follows * < 0.05; ** < 0.01; *** < 0.001.

Table A3: Model of regime convergence

DV: Mobility-preference	
New immigration countries (NIC)	3.095* (1.555)
Settler nations (SN)	−3.116 (1.956)
Year	−0.004*** (0.001)
NIC*Year	−0.001 (0.001)
SN*Year	0.002 (0.001)
Constant	7.687*** (1.129)
Observations	934
Adjusted R ²	0.395

*Note: Linear regression model on with an interaction term between the immigration regime type and a continuous time-variable (years). Level of statistical significance indicated as follows * < 0.05; ** < 0.01; *** < 0.001.*

Table A4: Model of path dependence

DV: Mobility-preference	
Initial condition	49.050*** (4.679)
Year	−0.003*** (0.0003)
Initial condition*Year	−0.024*** (0.002)
Constant	5.467*** (0.583)
Observations	934
Adjusted R ²	0.649

*Note: Linear regression model on with an interaction term between the initial condition (policy mix in the first year of the time series) and a continuous time-variable (years). Level of statistical significance indicated as follows * < 0.05; ** < 0.01; *** < 0.001.*

Table A5: Alternative model estimates

	DV: Mobility-preference			
	LDV	2FE	ALT1	ALT2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
LDV	0.779*** (0.053)			
Unemployment	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)
Radical-right vote	-0.001 (0.0004)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)
Left cabinet	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.052* (0.021)	-0.001 (0.018)	<i>Note: Linear</i>
Right cabinet	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.044* (0.018)	-0.003 (0.014)	
Union density				0.001 (0.001)
Observations	650	446	590	585
Adjusted R ²	0.653	-0.038	-0.018	-0.106

regression models with different specification: LDV (lagged dependent variable), 2FE (two-way fixed effects), ALT1 (left/right cabinet determined by head of government), ALT2 (government ideology replaced by union density). Level of statistical significance indicated as follows * < 0.05; ** < 0.01; *** < 0.001.

Figure A3: Predicted probabilities of convergence and path dependence





Figure A4: Evolution of mobility-preference by immigration regime type



Note: Same plot as in Figure 4 with the difference that borderline regime classifications (Norway, Finland, UK, Ireland, Israel) are excluded.