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Homicide and State History

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Part A: Data and Additional Tests

Table S1. Variable Definitions and Sources

OUTCOMES

Homicide rate (UN), log. Intentional homicides per 1,000. *Source:* UN Office on Drugs and Crime's International Homicide Statistics database, drawn from the World Development Indicators 2020, supplemented by data from an earlier version (drawn from the WDI 2017) that offers somewhat greater coverage.

Homicide rate (WHO), log. Intentional homicides per 1,000. *Source:* World Health Organization (World Health Data Platform).

Muggings and assaults per 100, log. Violent crime. *Source:* Gallup via Corcoran and Stark (2018: Table 1).

Prisoners per 100,000. Incarceration rate. Source: Clark and Herbolsheimer (2021).

STATE HISTORY

Government above tribal level in 1000 CE (z1). Whether a government exists on a territory above the tribal level, measured in 1000 CE. *Source*: Borcan et al. (2018).

Government locally based in 1000 CE (z2). Whether a locally-based government exists on a territory above the tribal level, measured in 1000 CE. *Source*: Borcan et al.(2018).

Share of territory ruled by government in 1000 CE (z3). The share of a territory ruled by a government (above the tribal level), measured in 1000 CE. *Source:* Borcan et al. (2018).

State history 3500 BCE - 2000 CE (1% discount). Source: Borcan et al. (2018).

State history 1-1950 CE (1% discount). Source: Borcan et al. (2018).

State history 3500 BCE - 1500 CE (1% discount). Source: Borcan et al. (2018).

State history 3500 BCE - 1 CE (1% discount). Source: Borcan et al. (2018).

State history 3500 BCE - 2000 CE (.1% discount). Source: Borcan et al. (2018).

State history 3500 BCE - 2000 CE (2% discount). Source: Borcan et al. (2018).

State history 3500 BCE – 1500 CE (.1% discount). Source: Borcan et al.(2018).

State history 3500 BCE - 1500 CE (2% discount). Source: Borcan et al. (2018).

State age 3500 BCE – 2000 CE (no discount). The length of time a government has existed across a territory. *Source:* Borcan et al. (2018).

Ancestry-adjusted state history 3500 BCE – 2000 CE (.1% discount). Ancestry-adjusted state history from 3500 BCE to 2000 CE with .1% depreciation rate. *Source:* Borcan et al. (2018).

Ancestry-adjusted state history 3500 BCE – 2000 CE (1% discount). Ancestry-adjusted state history from 3500 BCE to 2000 CE with 1% depreciation rate. *Source*: Borcan et al. (2018).

Ancestry-adjusted state history from 0 CE to 2000 CE with 5% depreciation rate (AdjState). *Source:* Putterman and Weil (2010).

Ancestry-adjusted state history 0-2000 (5% discount) (extended). Values for missing countries filled in based on values for neighboring countries with similar histories. *Source:* authors.

BENCHMARK CONTROLS

Temperature. Average annual temperature. Source: Gerring et al. (2022).

Ocean distance. Distance (km) to ocean averaged across all grid-cells for a country. *Source:* Gerring et al. (2022).

Latin America/Caribbean. Dummy variable coded 1 if country located in Latin America or the Caribbean. *Source:* authors.

European colonial duration. Duration (years) over which a European power exercised formal control. *Source*: Olsson (2009).

European ancestry. Share of population of European descent. Source: Gerring et al. (2022).

ADDITIONAL CONTROLS

Distance from equator (log). Source: Gerring et al. (2022).

Agricultural suitability. Crop suitability. Source: FAO-GAEZ dataset.

Rugged. Differences in elevation across grid-cells, aggregated to states. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).

Island. Dummy if country located primarily on non-continental landmass. *Source:* Gerring et al. (2022).

Natural borders. Share of a country's borders that aligns with a natural boundary. *Source:* Gerring et al. (2022).

Territory (log). Size of country. Source: Gerring et al. (2022).

Oil income per cap. The aggregated real value of a state's petroleum production as a share of total population. *Source:* Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Natural resource income per cap. The aggregated real value of a state's natural resource production as a share of total population. *Source:* Haber and Menaldo (2011).

GDP per cap (log). Gross domestic product per capita estimated from multiple sources using Maddison as the base value, transformed by the natural log. *Source*: Fariss et al. (2017).

Income inequality (gini). Gini coefficient of inequality. Source: World Income Inequality Database (Gradín 2021).

Civil conflict. Internal conflict event (dummy). Source: Gleditsch et al. (2002).

Battlefield casualties. Number of battle deaths per annum, counted if they surpass a threshold of 25. *Source*: Lacina (2009).

Population (log). Population estimated from multiple sources using Maddison as the base value, transformed by the natural log. *Source:* Fariss et al. (2017).

Population growth. Population growth, annual percentage increase. Source: WDI (2020).

Population density, 1500. Population density in 1500 CE, transformed by the natural logarithm. *Source:* Putterman and Weil (2010).

Population density, current. Population density. Source: WDI (2020).

Urbanization. Urban population, percent of total. Source: WDI (2020).

Male youth. Males age 15 to 24 as share of male population. *Source:* United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). *World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition. Rev. 1.*

Sex ratio at birth. Male births per female births. Source: WDI (2020).

Sex ratio in labor force. Ratio of female to male labor force participation rate (%), modeled ILO estimate. *Source*: WDI (2020).

Infant mortality (log). Deaths prior to first year of live per 1,000 live births. *Source*: WDI (2020).

Educational attainment. Average years of education in the total population age 15 years and older. *Source*: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2020), drawing on Clio-Infra (clio-infra.eu).

Literacy. Share of population who can read and write a sentence about everyday life. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2018), drawing on Miller (2015).

Ethnic fractionalization. Probability of two randomly chosen persons belonging to the same ethnic group. *Source:* Alesina et al. (2003).

Linguistic fractionalization. Probability of two randomly chosen persons belonging to the same linguistic group. *Source:* Alesina et al. (2003).

Religious fractionalization. Probability of two randomly chosen persons belonging to the same religious group. *Source:* Alesina et al. (2003).

Protestants (%). Number of Protestants as share (%) of population. Source: Gerring et al. (2022).

Year of independence. Year in which country recognized by international community. *Source:* authors.

Polyarchy. Index of electoral democracy. Source: Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al. 2020).

Polyarchy stock. Index of electoral democracy, stock measure with 1 percent annual depreciation. Calculated by authors based on Polyarchy variable (above).

Control of corruption (WB). Index of the degree to which corruption is controlled, combining multiple surveys of experts, businesspeople, and citizens. *Source:* World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2005).

Government effectiveness (WB). Index of government effectiveness, combining multiple surveys of experts, businesspeople, and citizens. *Source:* World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2005).

Political stability (WB). Index of political stability, combining multiple surveys of experts, businesspeople, and citizens. *Source*: World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2005).

Impartial public admin (VDem). The extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (i.e., nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination). The

question covers the public officials that handle the cases of ordinary people. If no functioning public administration exists, the lowest score (0) applies. *Source:* V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2021).

INSTRUMENT

Millennia since agricultural transition. Number of millennia since Neolithic transition to sedentary agriculture. *Source*: Putterman and Weil (2010).

MECHANISM MEASURES

Claiming un-entitled government benefits. Survey question: "Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: To claim government benefits to which you are not entitled." Ten-point scale stretching from "never justifiable" to "always justifiable." *Source:* combined European Values Survey/World Values Survey, wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2020).

Avoiding a fare on public transport. Survey question: "Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: Avoiding a fare on public transport." Ten-point scale stretching from "never justifiable" to "always justifiable." *Source:* combined European Values Survey/World Values Survey, wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2020).

Cheating on taxes. Survey question: "Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: Cheating on taxes." Ten-point scale stretching from "never justifiable" to "always justifiable." *Source:* combined European Values Survey/World Values Survey, wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2020).

Accepting a bribe. Survey question: "Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: Accepting a bribe." Ten-point scale stretching from "never justifiable" to "always justifiable." *Source:* combined European Values Survey/World Values Survey, wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2020).

Political violence. Survey question: "Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: Political violence." Ten-point scale stretching from "never justifiable" to "always justifiable." *Source:* combined European Values Survey/World Values Survey, wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2020).

MECHANISM CONTROLS

Age. Age of respondent. *Source:* combined European Values Survey/World Values Survey, wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2020).

Sex. Sex of respondent. *Source:* combined European Values Survey/World Values Survey, wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2020).

Education. Educational attainment (number of years) of respondent. *Source*: combined European Values Survey/World Values Survey, wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2020).

Mother's education. Educational attainment (number of years) of respondent's mother. *Source:* combined European Values Survey/World Values Survey, wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2020).

Employment status. Employment status (employed/unemployed) of respondent. *Source:* combined European Values Survey/World Values Survey, wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2020).

Size town (under 5,000). Interview conducted in town with less than 5,000 inhabitants. *Source:* combined European Values Survey/World Values Survey, wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2020).

Size town (5,000-20,000). Interview conducted in town of between 5,000 and 20,000 inhabitants. *Source:* combined European Values Survey/World Values Survey, wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2020).

Size town (20,000~100,000). Interview conducted in town of between 20,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. *Source:* combined European Values Survey/World Values Survey, wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2020).

Size town (100,000~500,000). Interview conducted in town of between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants. *Source:* combined European Values Survey/World Values Survey, wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2020).

Size town (500,000 and more). Interview conducted in town of more than 500,000 inhabitants. *Source:* combined European Values Survey/World Values Survey, wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2020).

 Table S2.
 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Dependent variables					
Homicide rate (UN), log	2,813	1.68	.96	.12	4.96
Homicide rate (WHO), log	870	1.90	.90	.21	4.52
Muggings and assaults per 100	133	1.74	.78	.00	3.53
Prisoners per 100,000	1,037	151.94	110.46	19	729
State history measures	·				
AdjState	2,813	.48	.24	0	1
Government above tribal level in 1000 CE (z1)	2,774	.56	.49	0	1
Government locally based in 1000 CE (z2)	2,774	.46	.43	0	1
Share of territory ruled by government in 1000 CE (z3)	2,774	.48	.44	0	1
State history 3500 BCE – 2000 CE (1% discount)	2,774	.25	.16	.02	.74
State history 1-1950 CE (1% discount)	2,774	.42	.26	.01	.98
State history 3500 BCE – 1500 CE (1% discount)	2,774	.18	.17	0	.76
State history 3500 BCE – 1 CE (1% discount)	2,774	.07	.13	0	.80
State history 3500 BCE – 2000 CE (.1% discount)	2,774	.19	.14	.01	.75
State history 3500 BCE – 2000 CE (2% discount)	2,774	.31	.18	.02	.73
State history 3500 BCE – 1500 CE (.1% discount)	2,774	.14	.15	0	.76
State history 3500 BCE – 1500 CE (2% discount)	2,774	.22	.20	0	.76
State age 3500 BCE – 2000 CE (no discount)	2,774	1694.35	1329.45	100	5200
Ancestry-adj. state hist. 3500 BCE – 2000 CE (.1% disc.)	2,774	.19	.13	0	.74
Ancestry-adj. state history 3500 BCE – 2000 CE (1% disc.)	2,774	.24	.15	0	.75
Benchmark controls					
Temperature	2,813	16.44	8.38	-5.5	29.80
Ocean distance	2,813	326.43	401.47	0	1838.61
Latin America/Caribbean (dummy)	2,813	.20	.40	0	1
European colonial duration	2,813	447.55	710.92	0	2000
European ancestry	2,813	37.78	41.16	0	100
Year	2,813	2004.60	7.70	1990	2017
Year ²	2,813	4018467.00	30868.03	3960100	4068289
Additional controls					
Distance from equator (log)	2,764	-1.33	.90	-4.50	34
Agricultural suitability	2,656	31.97	20.72	.00	78.79
Rugged	2,735	1.38	1.16	.02	6.20
Island	2,795	.15	.35	0	1
Natural borders	2,706	.85	.31	.04	1.45
Territory (log)	2,786	2.96	1.78	0	8.16
Oil income per cap	2,742	375.83	1703.67	0	15868.50
Natural resource income per cap	2,740	688.22	2571.69	0	28552.68
GDP per cap (log)	2,785	9.16	1.03	6.26	12.27
Income inequality (gini)	2,730	38.62	9.57	16.23	73.30
Civil conflict	2,813	.02	.28	0	6
Battlefield casualties	1,790	.00	.03	0	0.73
Population (log)	2,473	16.33	1.52	11.94	21.03
Population growth	2,812	1.07	1.38	-9.08	17.51
Population density, 1500	2,721	1.04	1.62	-3.82	3.84
Population density, current	2,809	239.73	883.27	1.59	7915.73
Urbanization	2,813	59.92	21.00	8.85	100
Male youth (share of all males)	2,813	.17	.03	.10	.25
Sex ratio at birth	1,589	1.06	.02	1.01	1.17
Sex ratio in labor force	2,813	69.12	17.23	10.14	106.31

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Infant mortality (log)	2,786	2.68	1.02	.59	4.85
Educational attainment	1,811	8.61	2.69	.99	13.30
Literacy	2,702	84.80	19.44	18.00	100
Ethnic fractionalization	2,754	.40	.23	.00	.93
Linguistic fractionalization	2,504	.34	.26	.00	.92
Religious fractionalization	2,581	.43	.22	.00	.86
Protestants (%)	2,799	14.19	20.07	0.00	90.24
Year of independence	2,786	1906.56	76.35	1776	1993
Polyarchy	2,789	.60	.26	.02	.92
Polyarchy stock	2,789	23.57	16.91	0.18	66.94
Control of corruption (WB)	1,192	.46	.94	-2.08	2.25
Government effectiveness (WB)	1,192	.14	.88	-2.68	1.72
Political stability (WB)	1,192	.33	1.00	-1.63	1.98
Impartial public admin (VDem)	2,791	.67	1.49	-2.68	3.61
Instrument					
Millennia since agricultural transition	2,790	5.00	2.37	.36	10.50
Mechanism measures					
Claiming un-entitled government benefits	98,808	2.69	2.50	1	10
Avoiding a fare on public transport	98,272	2.76	2.53	1	10
Cheating on taxes	99,278	2.17	2.13	1	10
Accepting a bribe	99,533	1.78	1.75	1	10
Political violence	95,742	1.82	1.79	1	10
Mechanism controls					
Age	98,808	45.15	17.02	16	82
Sex	98,808	1.54	.50	1	2
Education	98,808	2.04	.77	1	3
Mother's education	98,808	1.53	.71	1	3
Employment status	98,808	3.15	2.10	1	8
Size town (under 5,000)	98,808	.25	.43	0	1
Size town (5,000-20,000)	98,808	.19	.39	0	1
Size town (20,000~100,000)	98,808	.20	.40	0	1
Size town (100,000~500,000)	98,808	.17	.37	0	1
Size town (500,000 and more)	98,808	.18	.39	0	1

Note: For all state history measures, controls, and the instrument, we calculate descriptive statistics for non-missing observations that are included in the benchmark model (Model 4, Table 1 in the main text). For the mechanism controls, we calculate descriptive statistics for observations included in Model 1, Table 9 in the main text. For the dependent variables and mechanism measures, we calculate descriptive statistics for the samples on which they are estimated in the main text.

Figure S1. Histograms of Homicide Rates





Figure S2. Histogram of State History

Table S3. Countries and their AdjState Scores

Lesotho	.00	Moldova	.32	Bulgaria	.60
Uganda	.00	Sweden	.32	Algeria	.60
Burundi	.00	Panama	.33	Laos	.61
Philippines	.00	Belarus	.33	Denmark	.61
Papua New Guinea	.00	Honduras	.33	Hungary	.61
Mozambique	.00	Venezuela	.33	New Zealand	.62
Rwanda	.00	Fiji	.33	Armenia	.62
Gambia	.00	Mongolia	.33	Czechia	.62
Madagascar	.00	Slovakia	.35	Netherlands	.63
Zimbabwe	.01	Chile	.36	Mauritius	.63
Liberia	.01	Costa Rica	.36	Afghanistan	.63
Sierra Leone	.02	Dominican Rep	.37	Serbia	.63
Zambia	.02	Turkmenistan	.37	Yemen	.64
Malawi	.02	Mali	.38	Canada	.65
Swaziland	.03	Senegal	.40	Bosnia	.65
Benin	.03	Romania	.40	Cyprus	.65
Republic of Congo	.05	Cuba	.42	Australia	.66
Burkina Faso	.05	Cabo Verde	.42	Bolivia	.66
Togo	.06	Bangladesh	.43	Sudan	.67
DRC	.07	Azerbaijan	.44	Malaysia	.67
Botswana	.08	Guvana	.44	Uzbekistan	.67
Gabon	.08	Guatemala	.44	Iran	.68
Kenva	.10	Nigeria	.45	Belgium	.68
Cote d'Ivoire	.12	Trinidad/Tobago	.45	Switzerland	.68
Russia	.13	Poland	.48	India	.69
Estonia	14	Belize	48	Libva	69
Finland	.14	Macedonia	49	United Kingdom	.02
Angola	.14	Iordan	50	Italy	.70
South Africa	15	Slovenia	.50 51	Austria	.70
Latvia	16	Greece	52	Portugal	72
Kyrowzstan	18	Mexico	52	France	73
Haiti	.10	Tajikistan	52	Germany	.75
Chad	.10	Norway	53	Egypt	.75
Kazalzhetan	.19	Brozil	.55	Turkey	.70
Guipeo	.17	Ireland	.50	Tunicio	.70
Ghana	.20	Indonesia	.50	Morocco	.70
Ismaica	.22	Dom	.50	Delvistor	.//
Gamaraan	.23	Seein	.50	Somalia	.00
Equador	.24	Span	.50	Japan	.01
Equatorial Chinese	.25	Junited States	.57	Singapore	.05
Nicon	.23	Albania	.57	Mysenmen	.04
INIGET	.20	Albania	.30	Nyannar	.04
	.27	Croatia	.38	INEPAI	.84
El Calara de a	.28	Oruguay	.38	Hong Kong	.00
El Salvador	.28	Qatar	.58	l aiwan	.89
	.28	Inaliand	.59	Sri Lanka	.89
Nicaragua	.50	Argentina	.59	Cambodia	.89
Paraguay	.31	Georgia	.59	South Korea	.90
CAR	.31	Israel	.60	China	.91
Mauritania	.31	Vietnam	.60	Ethiopia	1.00

	Table S4. Specification	n Tests for M	luggings, Ass	aults	
Model	Added variable(s)	AdjSt	ate	Countries/Obs	R^2
1	[Benchmark]	-1.247**	(-4.906)	133	.524
2	Region dummies	477	(-1.739)	133	.603
3	Distance from equator (log)	-1.243**	(-4.458)	131	.515
4	Agricultural suitability	-1.135**	(-4.505)	132	.521
5	Rugged	-1.179**	(-4.637)	130	.529
6	Island	-1.236**	(-5.295)	133	.588
7	Natural borders	-1.075 **	(-4.202)	127	.516
8	Territory (log)	-1.215**	(-4.591)	132	.520
9	Oil income per cap	-1.187 **	(-4.688)	132	.520
10	Natural resource income per cap	-1.187 **	(-4.679)	132	.520
11	GDP per cap (log)	874**	(-3.515)	132	.555
12	Income inequality (gini)	-1.063 **	(-3.981)	130	.529
13	Civil conflict	-1.247 **	(-4.906)	133	.524
14	Battlefield casualties	-1.278 **	(-4.768)	132	.524
15	Population (log)	-1.250 **	(-4.567)	132	.521
16	Population growth	-1.200**	(-4.786)	133	.532
17	Population density, 1500	-1.278 **	(-5.134)	130	.537
18	Population density, current	-1.136**	(-4.453)	132	.559
19	Urbanization	-1.176**	(-4.709)	133	.533
20	Male youth (share of all males)	-1.109 **	(-4.213)	133	.542
21	Sex ratio at birth	-1.031**	(-3.721)	133	.541
22	Sex ratio in labor force	-1.433**	(-5.185)	133	.534
23	Infant mortality (log)	824**	(-3.320)	132	.592
24	Educational attainment	986**	(-4.135)	120	.608
25	Literacy	-1.084 **	(-5.253)	131	.640
26	Ethnic fractionalization	-1.099**	(-4.313)	131	.534
27	Linguistic fractionalization	911**	(-3.632)	128	.561
28	Religious fractionalization	-1.202**	(-4.781)	132	.518
29	Protestants (%)	-1.324**	(-5.109)	132	.528
30	Year of independence	-1.291**	(-5.071)	132	.533
31	Polyarchy+ Polyarchy ²	-1.072 **	(-4.278)	132	.556
32	Polyarchy stock	-1.215**	(-4.661)	132	.525
33	Control of corruption (WB)	587*	(-2.334)	78	.586
34	Government effectiveness (WB)	483	(-1.854)	78	.592
35	Political stability (WB)	712**	(-2.975)	78	.608
36	Rule of law (WB)	566*	(-2.223)	78	.593
37	Impartial public admin (VDem)	-1.254**	(-4.942)	132	.534
38	Kinship intensity index	-1.167**	(-4.72)	132	.533

Note: Outcome: muggings and assaults per 100 (Gallup via Corcoran and Stark 2018: Table 1), log. Results shown for AdjState in 38 regression tests, replicating the format of Table 2 in the main text. *Omitted:* temperature, ocean distance, Latin America/Caribbean (dummy), European colonial duration, European ancestry, constant. *Year:* 2010. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares regression, *t* statistics are in parentheses.

	Table S5. Spe	cification	Tests for Inc	arceration	Rate		
Model	Added variable(s)	A	djState	Countries	Years	Obs.	\mathbb{R}^2
1	[Benchmark]	-120.744**	(-3.700)	132	22	1,037	.400
2	Region dummies	-108.363*	(-2.517)	132	22	1,037	.437
3	Distance from equator (log)	-121.971**	(-3.593)	129	22	1,017	.398
4	Agricultural suitability	-118.356**	(-3.600)	131	22	1,028	.401
5	Rugged	-115.008 **	(-3.445)	129	22	1,016	.406
6	Island	-119.831**	(-3.671)	131	22	1,028	.400
7	Natural borders	-129.335**	(-3.802)	127	22	1,013	.419
8	Territory (log)	-119.533**	(-3.589)	132	22	1,037	.400
9	Oil income per cap	-125.357**	(-3.890)	132	22	1,037	.407
10	Natural resource income per cap	-124.590**	(-3.875)	132	22	1,037	.404
11	GDP per cap (log)	-125.927**	(-3.935)	132	22	1,037	.421
12	Income inequality (gini)	-124.972^{**}	(-3.645)	130	21	1,024	.403
13	Civil conflict	-120.323**	(-3.681)	132	22	1,037	.400
14	Battlefield casualties	-138.665**	(-3.815)	130	14	576	.443
15	Population (log)	-120.802 **	(-3.142)	131	20	945	.409
16	Population growth	-133.850 **	(-4.260)	132	22	1,037	.444
17	Population density, 1500	-116.439**	(-3.271)	130	22	1,022	.404
18	Population density, current	-127.786 **	(-3.758)	132	22	1,037	.415
19	Urbanization	-119.634**	(-3.669)	132	22	1,037	.400
20	Male youth (share of all males)	-123.748**	(-3.624)	132	22	1,037	.400
21	Sex ratio at birth	-113.782**	(-3.349)	132	12	681	.403
22	Sex ratio in labor force	-99.975**	(-2.810)	132	22	1,037	.410
23	Infant mortality (log)	-133.104**	(-3.947)	132	22	1,037	.417
24	Educational attainment	-149.686^{**}	(-4.480)	119	16	636	.486
25	Literacy	-109.151**	(-3.333)	132	22	1,035	.429
26	Ethnic fractionalization	-122.067**	(-3.617)	130	22	1,023	.401
27	Linguistic fractionalization	-118.692**	(-3.439)	127	21	926	.442
28	Religious fractionalization	-115.967**	(-3.235)	131	21	948	.410
29	Protestants (%)	-140.514 **	(-3.794)	131	22	1,032	.409
30	Year of independence	-125.233**	(-3.692)	132	22	1,037	.400
31	Polyarchy+ Polyarchy ²	-128.948**	(-3.998)	132	22	1,037	.423
32	Polyarchy stock	-116.245**	(-3.660)	132	22	1,037	.410
33	Control of corruption (WB)	-158.885^{**}	(-3.102)	85	17	534	.357
34	Government effectiveness (WB)	-158.568**	(-3.082)	85	17	534	.356
35	Political stability (WB)	-159.558**	(-3.071)	85	17	534	.356
36	Rule of law (WB)	-161.039**	(-3.183)	85	17	534	.363
37	Impartial public admin (VDem)	-122.354**	(-3.653)	132	22	1,037	.401
38	Kinship intensity index	-130.808**	(-4.06)	131	22	1,028	.427

Note: Outcome: prisoners per 100,000 (Gallup via Corcoran and Stark 2018: Table 1), log. Results shown for AdjState in 38 regression tests, replicating the specification tests in Table 2 in the main text. *Omitted:* temperature, ocean distance, Latin America/Caribbean (dummy), European colonial duration, European ancestry, year, year², Ln GDP p.c., Ln GDP p.c.2, constant. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares regression, *t* statistics are in parentheses.

	Table S6. Results for AdjState when replicating the 38 specifications in Table 2 in the main text on an alternative version of the benchmark (Model 3, Table 1), omitting the European ancestry variable														
		Resu	ults from T	Table 2 (r	egular	bend	chmark)		Results from more parsimonious version						
									of b	enchmark	omitting	Euro	pean	ancestr	у
	Control added	Coef.	<i>t</i> -val.	Std. co.	Co.	Yr.	Obs.	\mathbb{R}^2	Coef.	<i>t</i> -val.	Std. co.	Co.	Yr.	Obs.	\mathbb{R}^2
1	[Benchmark]	-1.421**	(-6.533)	[356]	146	28	2,813	.646	-1.429**	(-6.523)	(358)	146	28	.629	2,814
2	Region dummies	-1.193**	(-6.247)	[299]	146	28	2,813	.663	-1.297**	(-6.595)	(324)	146	28	.634	2,814
3	Distance from equator (log)	-1.466**	(-6.592)	[366]	143	28	2,764	.646	-1.461**	(-6.474)	(365)	143	28	.627	2,765
4	Agricultural suitability	-1.345**	(-5.784)	[335]	143	27	2,656	.648	-1.403**	(-5.957)	(350)	143	27	.628	2,657
5	Rugged	-1.418**	(-6.206)	[349]	142	28	2,735	.644	-1.444**	(-6.377)	(356)	142	28	.630	2,736
6	Island	-1.417**	(-6.546)	[355]	145	28	2,795	.650	-1.424**	(-6.520)	(356)	145	28	.631	2,796
7	Natural borders	-1.347**	(-5.916)	[336]	139	20	2,706	.637	-1.380**	(-5.985)	(345)	139	28	.619	2,707
8	Territory (log)	-1.419**	(-6.273)	[352]	145	28	2,786	.645	-1.422**	(-6.232)	(353)	145	28	.626	2,787
9	Oil income per cap	-1.390**	(-6.238)	[345]	144	28	2,742	.650	-1.405**	(-6.248)	(349)	144	28	.633	2,743
10	Natural resource income per cap	-1.386**	(-6.216)	[344]	144	28	2, 740	.651	-1.402**	(-6.234)	(348)	144	28	.634	2,741
11	GDP per cap (log)	-1.341**	(-5.748)	[333]	145	28	2,785	.645	-1.311**	(-5.534)	(326)	145	28	.630	2,786
12	Income inequality (gini)	-1.237**	(-6.116)	[311]	142	28	2,730	.658	-1.219**	(-6.077)	(307)	142	28	.649	2,731
13	Civil conflict	-1.424**	(-6.575)	[356]	146	28	2,813	.647	-1.432**	(-6.570)	(358)	146	28	.631	2,814
14	Battlefield casualties	-1.575**	(-7.252)	[394]	144	19	1,790	.661	-1.585**	(-7.327)	(396)	144	19	.648	1,791
15	Population (log)	-1.485**	(-6.128)	[371]	145	25	2,473	.647	-1.491**	(-6.011)	(373)	145	25	.628	2,474
16	Population growth	-1.449**	(-6.901)	[363]	146	28	2,812	.665	-1.453**	(-6.814)	(364)	146	28	.642	2,813
17	Population density, 1500	-1.337**	(-6.142)	[337]	142	28	2,721	.645	-1.368**	(-6.068)	(345)	142	28	.627	2,722
18	Population density, current	-1.352**	(-6.060)	[338]	146	28	2,809	.651	-1.374**	(-6.084)	(344)	146	28	.632	2,810
19	Urbanization	-1.342**	(-6.154)	[336]	146	28	2,813	.653	-1.330**	(-6.098)	(333)	146	28	.640	2,814
20	Male youth (share of all males)	-1.292**	(-6.281)	[323]	146	28	2,813	.655	-1.254**	(-6.138)	(314)	146	28	.649	2,814
21	Sex ratio at birth	-1.190**	(-5.420)	[301]	146	15	1,589	.645	-1.246**	(-5.536)	(315)	146	15	.624	1,589

22	Sex ratio in labor force	-1.450**	(-6.291)	[363]	146	28	2,813	.646	-1.491**	(-6.435)	(373)	146	28	.631	2,814
23	Infant mortality (log)	-1.227**	(-5.924)	[305]	145	28	2,786	.657	-1.193**	(-5.741)	(296)	145	28	.652	2,787
24	Educational attainment	-1.508**	(-6.646)	[382]	125	21	1,811	.660	-1.486**	(-6.561)	(377)	125	21	.645	1,812
25	Literacy	-1.406**	(-6.367)	[353]	143	28	2,702	.644	-1.414**	(-6.323)	(355)	143	28	.631	2,703
26	Ethnic fractionalization	-1.372**	(-6.216)	[340]	143	28	2,754	.645	-1.383**	(-6.090)	(343)	143	28	.628	2,755
27	Linguistic fractionalization	-1.350**	(-6.084)	[346]	139	26	2,504	.651	-1.345**	(-5.880)	(345)	139	26	.638	2,505
28	Religious fractionalization	-1.379**	(-6.302)	[346]	144	26	2,581	.641	-1.400**	(-6.428)	(351)	144	26	.623	2,582
29	Protestants (%)	-1.421**	(-6.297)	[355]	145	28	2,799	.647	-1.427**	(-6.329)	(357)	145	28	.631	2,800
30	Year of independence	-1.432**	(-6.060)	[356]	145	28	2,786	.644	-1.433**	(-5.917)	(356)	145	28	.626	2,787
31	Polyarchy (linear, squared)	-1.322**	(-5.793)	[335]	145	28	2,789	.660	-1.319**	(-5.745)	(334)	145	28	.653	2,790
32	Polyarchy stock	-1.409**	(6.421)	[357]	145	28	2,789	.643	-1.386**	(-6.319)	(351)	145	28	.631	2,790
33	Control of corruption (WB)	-1.469**	(-3.904)	[342]	88	22	1,192	.682	-1.451**	(-3.852)	(338)	88	22	.676	1,192
34	Government effectiveness (WB)	-1.480**	(-3.755)	[345]	88	22	1,192	.670	-1.463**	(-3.667)	(341)	88	22	.660	1,192
35	Political stability (WB)	-1.594**	(-5.089)	[371]	88	22	1,192	.709	-1.591**	(-5.103)	(371)	88	22	.708	1,192
36	Rule of law (WB)	-1.463**	(-4.022)	[341]	88	22	1,192	.682	-1.591**	(-5.103)	(371)	88	22	.708	1,192
37	Impartial public admin (VDem)	-1.382**	(-6.335)	[350]	145	28	2,791	.653	-1.375**	(-6.319)	(348)	145	28	.647	2,792
38	Kinship intensity index	-1.395**	(-6.346)	[348]	145	28	2,786	.626	-1.395**	(-6.346)	(348)	145	28	.626	2,786

Note: Results shown for AdjState in different tests. Outcome: homicide rate (UN), log. Benchmarks include: temperature, ocean distance, Latin America/Caribbean (dummy), European colonial duration, year, year², constant. European ancestry included in leftmost columns. Estimator: ordinary least squares regression, clustered standard errors, *t* statistics are in parentheses, standardized regression coefficients in brackets.

	Bivariate	Geography	Early modern	Early modern
	1	2	(pursimonious) 3	(<i>ventismurk</i>) 4
AdjState	-2.164**	-1.529**	-1.465**	-1.456**
,	(-8.019)	(-6.314)	(-6.359)	(-6.385)
	[531]	[375]	[359]	[357]
Temperature		.013	.005	009
		(1.624)	(.681)	(936)
		[.111]	[.047]	[077]
Ocean distance		.000**	.000*	.000
		(3.765)	(2.339)	(.985)
		[.192]	[.125]	[.061]
Latin America/Caribbean (dummy)		1.328**	1.338**	1.408**
		(8.113)	(8.079)	(8.775)
		[.550]	[.555]	[.584]
European colonial duration			000**	000*
			(-4.454)	(-2.547)
			[167]	[109]
European ancestry				005**
				(-3.016)
				[195]
Countries	131	130	130	130
Years	29	29	29	29
Observations	2,773	2,689	2,687	2,686
R-squared	.290	.619	.642	.660

Table S7. Replicating Table 1 from the main text with only the most recent version of the UNODC dataset on homicides (omitting 2017 observations later removed by UNODC)

Note: Outcome: homicide rate (UN), log. *Omitted:* year, year², constant. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares regression, clustered standard errors, *t* statistics are in parentheses. Standardized regression coefficients are in brackets.

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests). < AUTHOR: p<0.1 deleted per ASA guidelines, and the other significance symbols were put into ASR style.>

	Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	WLS	WLS	WLS
	Weighting				Abs. res.	Abs. res.	Squ. res.
	Sample	Full	Fair + Good quality	Good quality	Full (w. 2019 qual. score)	Full (w. 2019 qual. score)	Full (w. 2019 qual. score)
		1	2	3	4	5	6
AdjState		-1.421**	-1.921**	-1.644**	-1.476**	-1.491**	-1.506**
		(-6.533)	(-6.007)	(-3.194)	(-26.494)	(-27.343)	(-27.236)
		[356]	[377]	[280]	[337]	[344]	[333]
Temperature		004	.014	.032*	002	002	.002
		(514)	(1.322)	(2.092)	(754)	(826)	(.955)
		[039]	[.116]	[.250]	[015]	[017]	[.019]
Ocean distance		.000	.000	.001**	.000**	.000**	.000**
		(1.430)	(1.966)	(2.840)	(5.891)	(5.731)	(7.241)
		[.085]	[.122]	[.219]	[.085]	[.084]	[.102]
Latin Am./Carib. (dummy)		1.354**	1.088**	1.080**	1.340**	1.322**	1.299**
		(8.930)	(5.836)	(3.876)	(34.724)	(32.887)	(31.974)
		[.565]	[.463]	[.471]	[.568]	[.560]	[.552]
European colonial duration		000*	000	000	000**	000**	000**
		(-2.577)	(-1.784)	(703)	(-1.771)	(-1.873)	(-1.269)
		[106]	[082]	[048]	[104]	[106]	[102]
European ancestry		004**	004**	004	004**	005**	004**
		(-2.957)	(-2.705)	(-1.817)	(-12.585)	(-12.123)	(-11.517)
		[188]	[169]	[142]	[183]	[195]	[181]
Data quality						.035	.029
						(1.885)	(1.586)
						[.026]	[.021]

Table S8. Assessing Sensitivity to Data Quality

Countries	146	83	40	125	125	125
Years	28	28	28	28	28	28
Observations	2,813	2,118	1,067	2,717	2,717	2,717
R-squared	.646	.734	.794	.682	.678	.695

Note: Outcome: homicide rate (UN), log. *Omitted:* year, year², constant. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares regression with clustered standard errors in Models 1, 2, and 3 and weighted least squares with robust standard errors in Models 4, 5, and 6. The weighting variable is UNODC's overall quality assessment rating ("Data quality") for the 2019 version of the dataset (see UNODC 2019b:xviii), which takes the values 1 (Low), 2 (Fair), or 3 (Good). In Models 4 and 5, we weigh the observations as proportional to data quality, using the absolute value of the residuals. In Model 6, we still use data quality as a weighting variable, but we try an alternative weighting scheme, using the squared residuals. Number of observations is lower in the regressions weighting (and, for Models 5 and 6, controlling) for data quality, because UNODC omitted some countries from the 2017 dataset that we include in the benchmark, and these then do not receive a quality score. *t*-statistics are in parentheses. Standardized regression coefficients are in brackets.



Figure S3. State history with varying discount rates

Note: Outcome: homicide rate (UN), log. *Omitted:* temperature, ocean distance, Latin America/Caribbean (dummy), European colonial duration, European ancestry, year, year², constant. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares regression, clustered standard errors. *Displayed:* regression coefficients with 95% CIs for Statehist measured from 4000 BCE to 2000 CE at 50-year intervals with different discount rates, as indicated along the *y*-axis.



Figure S4. State history with varying start-dates

Note: Outcome: homicide rate (UN), log. *Omitted:* temperature, ocean distance, Latin America/Caribbean (dummy), European colonial duration, European ancestry, year, year², constant. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares regression, clustered standard errors. *Displayed:* regression coefficients with 95% CIs for Statehist measured from different start-dates (at 50-year increments), as indicated along the *y*-axis. The last year of measurement is always 2000 CE.



Figure S5. State history with varying end-dates



Estimator:	OLS (benchmark)	Between- effects	Tobit	Poisson
	1	2	3	4
AdjState	-1.42**	-1.14**	-1.42**	88**
	(-6.53)	(-6.00)	(-6.55)	(-6.62)
Temperature	00	.00	00	00
	(51)	(.54)	(50)	(59)
Ocean distance	.00	.00*	.00	.00
	(1.43)	(2.14)	(1.44)	(1.41)
Latin America/Caribbean (dummy)	1.35**	1.23**	1.35**	.69**
	(8.93)	(9.11)	(8.94)	(1.24)
European colonial duration	00*	00	00**	00**
	(-2.58)	(-1.74)	(-2.59)	(-4.48)
European ancestry	00**	00*	00**	00**
	(-2.96)	(-2.45)	(-2.97)	(-2.73)
Countries	146	146	146	146
Years	29	29	29	29
Observations	2,813	2,813	2,813	2,813
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared	.646	.545	.378	.120

Table S9. Alternative Estimators

Note: Outcome: homicide rate (UN), log. *Omitted:* year, year², constant. *Estimator:* see top row, clustered standard errors in Models 1, 3, and 4 and classical standard errors in Model 2, *t* statistics are in parentheses.

Part B: Mechanisms

In the article, we demonstrated a robust association between state history (ancestry-adjusted) and reduced homicide, along with ancillary analyses focused on other species of violent crime. In this supplement, we turn to a consideration of the causal mechanisms that might be at work in this relationship. Why are countries with longer state histories less violent?

Our explanation, laid out in the main text, centers on changes in social norms and subsequent habituation and increased self-control. But there are other plausible explanations. These alternative accounts may be viewed either as mechanisms or as confounders, depending on one's construal of the datagenerating process. As such, the specification tests presented in the main text bear directly on our discussion.

Perhaps the most obvious candidate is *state capacity*. A state that is capable of performing its law-enforcement functions is likely to deter aggressors. A state capable of performing its judicial functions is likely to displace conflict from combat to courtroom. These capacities presumably develop over time so that older states, with greater experience, enjoy greater capacity than younger states. However, Table 2 in the main text provides no evidence for a pathway running from state history to reduced homicide through measures of contemporary state capacity. Tested variables include *rigorous and impartial public administration* from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2020) and good governance indices from WGI (Kaufmann et al. 2005) such as *rule of law, government effectiveness, political stability*, and *corruption control*. None attenuate the effect of AdjState on homicide.

Second, state history affects homicide through influencing *inequality*. We can show that AdjState mitigates inequality, and many studies attest to the exacerbating effect of inequality on homicide (e.g., Daly 2016). Putterman and Weil (2010) show that the variance in state history across residents of a country accounts for present-day within-country inequality, a somewhat different argument. However, the inclusion of inequality in our benchmark has no effect on estimates for AdjState (Model 12, Table 2), suggesting it is not operating as a pathway.

Third, AdjState could affect homicide through societal *heterogeneity*—ethnic, linguistic, and/or religious. Studies show that state history attenuates heterogeneity (Ahlerup and Olsson 2012; Wimmer 2016), and others suggest heterogeneity predicts homicide (Altheimer 2007), although we find weak evidence for the latter proposition (Table 2). Much depends on how this elusive

quantity is operationalized. Regardless, there is no evidence for heterogeneity as a mediator of the relationship (Models 26, 27, and 28, Table 2).

Fourth, living within a state enhances the *modernization* of societies (Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman 2002). Plausibly, individuals with more income or human capital are less inclined to resort to violence. However, this interpretation also runs afoul of the evidence. Note that tests in Tables 1 and 2 condition on virtually every distal and proximal feature of modernization, including European ancestry, Protestantism, per capita GDP, urbanization, population density, population growth, population, infant mortality, educational attainment, and literacy. None of these factors do very much to attenuate the impact of AdjState on homicide.

Fifth, state history could foster state *legitimacy*. When a government, and especially a police force, is perceived as legitimate, citizens are more likely to work through legal channels and less likely to settle disputes outside the pale of the law (Dawson 2017; Tyler and Jackson 2014). However, measures of legitimacy contained in the World Values Survey—including confidence in government, confidence in the justice system, confidence in the police, and respect for authority—are not predicted by AdjState.

In summary, there is scant evidence for alternative accounts centered on state capacity, inequality, heterogeneity, modernization, or legitimacy. To be sure, these concepts are famously difficult to operationalize. It is possible that with different measures, or better data, we might find stronger relationships. On this tentative note, we turn to a mechanism indicated by our argument.

Law-abidingness

In the main text, we outlined our theory about, inter alia, the role of states in changing social norms with respect to the use of violence. If the argument holds, countries with long (ancestry-adjusted) state history should more often display a culture of law-abidingness.

The World Values Survey, conducted in collaboration with the European Values Survey in Wave 7 (2017 to 2020), includes questions intended to elicit tolerance for criminal activity. Respondents in 75 countries are asked whether they think it is justifiable to (a) claim government benefits to which one is not entitled, (b) to avoid a fare on public transport, (c) to cheat on one's taxes, (d) to accept a bribe, and (e) to engage in political violence.

In Table S10, we treat these questions as outcomes in analyses that include the benchmark set of country-level covariates along with a set of individual-level covariates: age, sex, education, mother's education, employment status, and size

of town or metropolitan area (excluding these individual-level attributes has little effect on the results). Errors are clustered by country, as previously.

AdjState is associated with lower tolerance of law-breaking. The estimated effect is modest, perhaps because the treatment of theoretical interest is measured at the country level and there are fewer than 70 countries in the sample. Furthermore, cross-country surveys, conducted in different languages where the nuances and meanings of the translated terms may differ, may suffer from measurement equivalence issues, which could influence results. In addition, there are issues related to sampling within countries and related uncertainty with the country-level estimates. Even so, the results, which are consistently negative and with sizeable *t*-values, are in line with our claim that a heritage of stateness contributes to a culture of law-abidingness.

Justified?	Claiming un- entitled government benefits	Avoiding a fare on public transport	Cheating on taxes	Accepting a bribe	Political violence
Models	1	2	3	4	5
AdjState	817	-1.765**	-1.311**	834*	768
	(-1.484)	(-3.321)	(-3.444)	(-2.073)	(-1.927)
Countries	68	67	68	68	67
Observations	98,808	98,272	99,278	99,533	95,742
R-squared	.0816	.0720	.0386	.0278	.0218

Table S10. Attitudinal Measures of Law-Abidingness

Note: Question: "Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between" (EVS/WVS wave 7). *Omitted country-level variables:* temperature, ocean distance, Latin America/Caribbean (dummy), European colonial duration, European ancestry. *Omitted individual-level variables:* age, sex, education, mother's education, employment status, size of town (five categories), constant. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares regression, country clustered standard errors, *t* statistics are in parenthesis. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

We end our discussion of mechanisms with a plea for caution. Further analysis shows that our chosen mediators reduce the estimated coefficient for AdjState by only a fraction, once we control for the survey items on law-breaking. It turns out these items are not strongly and significantly related to homicide rates in the limited samples. The lack of correlation may reflect methodological issues discussed above, but there could also be more substantive reasons underlying these findings. Our argument—and Elias's original argument and much of the reviewed literature building on Elias—indicates that vocal support for particular norms of nonviolence or law-abidingness is insufficient for mitigating violent (and other "uncivilized") behavior. In addition, individuals must properly internalize such norms and become accustomed to acting upon them, for instance by feeling sufficiently ashamed when violating them.

Furthermore, peacefully resolving conflicts and avoiding the urge to violence also requires the development of self-control—a long and painstaking process. If so, explicitly abiding by laws may simply be too weak of a signal of true intentions and (especially) abilities to act in accordance with these norms. To properly test the theorized mechanism, we would thus need behavioral measures of how norms of nonviolence are internalized, or behavioral measures of selfrestraint, across a global sample of countries. We hope others will come up with such measures and leave this question for future research. Yet, we note that Eisner (2014) finds several indications that different measures proxying for selfcontrol correlate negatively with homicide rates and follow the same temporal patterns in several (typically Western) countries with extensive time series data.

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